



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Speaking of the present conflict Professor Wright says:

So far as the outbreak of the war in 1914 is concerned, France stands with a clear conscience. She had nothing to do with the disputes between Austria and Serbia, or between Austria, Germany, and Russia. Once war proved inevitable France faithfully accepted the responsibilities of the Russian alliance. Against France, Germany was an open aggressor. Germany's strategic plans for the quick annihilation of France, before attacking Russia, are well known to the world. Everybody is aware how scrupulously France avoided every hostile measure, and, during the critical days preceding the war, withdrew all troops ten kilometres from the frontier to prevent a clash. The Germans were obliged, in order to justify their advance, to invent preposterous tales of bombs dropped by aeroplanes near Nuremberg or of the violation of Belgian neutrality by French officers in automobiles. France had no idea of invading Belgium. All the French strategic plans aimed at the protection of the direct frontier, and they were dislocated by the dishonest move of Germany through Belgium.

CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN.

The German Empire between Two Wars: a Study of the Political and Social Development of the Nation between 1871 and 1914.

By ROBERT HERNDON FIFE, JR., Professor in Wesleyan University. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1916. Pp. xiv, 400.)

PROFESSOR FIFE'S *The German Empire between Two Wars* owes its title, but little else to the outbreak of the present European conflagration. The book was conceived in times of peace, and in its chapters the war receives only incidental mention. Much that is said, however, is given special point by the events of the past two years and by the situation in which the empire, as a belligerent nation, now finds itself.

The author's purpose has been to subject to close scrutiny the external and internal history of Germany since 1871, with a view to ascertaining the reasons for the contrast between "the progress of the nation along economic lines and its arrest in political and social development". That such a contrast exists, and that it has aroused speculation in many minds, is an indubitable fact. In the earlier portions of Mr. Fife's book one, however, gets a somewhat exaggerated impression of the magnitude of this disparity. For, after all, economic growth and social progress are inextricably bound up together, and there has been in Germany an arrest of, at the most, only certain aspects of social development; while even the political situation has undergone substantial alteration, notwithstanding the insignificance of structural changes. In fairness it must be said that in the body of his book Mr. Fife corrects his too dogmatic prefatory statements in this connection.

The volume falls into four parts. In the first there is a review of the empire's foreign relations during forty-three years, together with a characterization of the nation's ambitions abroad as they have developed

in recent times under the influence of population growth, industrial expansion, and international competition for markets. German diplomacy is characterized as, in general, vacillating and inferior to the diplomacy of other states, and the German masses are affirmed to be measurably responsible for the sabre-rattling and the bumptiousness which have impaired the favor with which the German name is regarded. But it is maintained that the inferiority of the German periodical press and the limited use in other countries of the German language have usually prevented the German side of international controversies from being properly presented to the world; and it is conceded that, in view of the populational and industrial conditions that have arisen in the empire, the determination to acquire sea-power, colonies, naval posts—in short, the much-talked-of “place in the sun”—has been natural, inevitable, and justifiable. In view of the decline of the birth-rate, the almost complete cessation of emigration, the phenomenally rapid growth of German foreign trade in the past two decades, and the large room left for development on existing lines, the empire's necessity seems to the reviewer less compelling than it is represented by the author to have been.

The second part of the volume is devoted to government and parties; the third to a group of contemporary national problems, *i. e.*, the Proletarian in Politics, the Church in Politics, the Administration of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Polish Question; and the fourth to Transformations and Tendencies, in municipal affairs, in education, and in public opinion as affected by the press. The book is one of no slight merit. It is not, and it does not purport to be, a treatise abounding in hitherto unknown facts or in novel interpretations. The threads which the author follows wind through familiar fields. None the less, the essentials of later German development are somewhat fully and very accurately described, in a style which, without being conspicuous, is fresh, vigorous, and acceptable. And it should be added that certain chapters, *e. g.*, those devoted to the Polish question and the issues of State and Church in the schools, comprise perhaps the best brief discussions of the subjects of which they treat to be had in English. Statistics are presented very sparingly, and there are practically no citations of authorities. Since the book is designed to engage the interest of the general reader, these aspects of it are perhaps justifiable. But space should have been found for a selected bibliography.

FREDERIC AUSTIN OGG.

The Diplomacy of the Great War. By ARTHUR BULLARD. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1916. Pp. xiv, 344.)

THIS interesting and suggestive volume is described in the preface as an attempt to provide an introductory text-book for a “first-year course in European diplomacy”. The author claims for it the “same relation to a treatise on diplomacy that a high school ‘algebra’ has to a text-book in ‘celestial mechanics’”.